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Abstract
The President and the Senate bargain over the appointment of the Head of a
key government department. The operating unit of the department has private in-
formation about its operating environment. We model the appointment process as
a constrained delegation of policymaking to the operating unit (agency). When the
Senate is su¢ ciently close to the agency the President has to give the agency more
authority. On the other hand, given the Senates ideal point, when the information is
more precise the President can tighten delegation bounds.
Keywords Appointments, bargaining, veto-based delegation, constrained delega-
tion.
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1 Introduction
When it comes to political control over bureaucracy, the political appointment process is
of signicant importance. In this process, the democratically elected President and the
members of the Senate; each having di¤erent objectives interact in a complex way. For
key government departments in the United States of America, the President nominates
the Head (the secretary at the U.S. Department of Commerce or the U.S. Department of
Labor) while the Senate has the authority to approve or reject the nominee. This process
can be viewed as a bargaining game between the elected politicians, and it is arguable who
has more bargaining power and how the multiplicity of political actors a¤ects the outcome.
Another important issue is that the elected politicians do not have precise information
about the department operating environment. The operating units of the department
possess such knowledge and usually remain unchanged under di¤erent administrations.
Although each new administration tries to overcome the problem of poor information, the
complexity of the environment inevitably leads to some form of delegation of policymaking
authority to the department.
To address the interactions between the multiplicity of political players and the degree
of discretion of the operating units of the department we propose a relatively novel concept
of the appointment process - one in which a nominee (the Head) interacts with politicians,
but plays no real policymaking role. In this paper, we embed a principal-agent problem
within the department that is viewed as an organization which consists of two parts, the
Head of the department (the principal) and the operating unit (the agency).1 Although
the Head plays the role of principal in this model, his preferences reect a compromise
between the preferred policies of the President who nominates and the Senate which
conrms. We assume that the politicians have no precise knowledge of the departmental
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operating environment.
The model of the appointment process essential in this paper enlists two stages: the
rst is the bargaining stage in which the President nominates and the Senate conrms the
nomination. If the Senate disapproves the nomination, then the prevailing policy is dened
by the status quo, given the agencys complete authority over decisions. The second stage
involves departmental policymaking. This stage is modeled as a veto-based delegation:
the operating unit initiates the policy and the Head approves it or vetoes it. Thus, the
department is given a certain degree of discretion which is limited by the Heads veto-
power. This degree of departmental discretion is the outcome of the bargaining process
between the elected politicians in the rst stage and it depends on the relative bargaining
power of politicians. It is convenient for our purposes to dene the political weight of the
politician in bargaining as the ability to move the department towards his or her preferred
policy.
The principal-agent approach to the appointment process allows a consideration of
two related objectives.2 First, to study a comparative statics question, we ask how the
extent of authority given to the agency changes as the degree of congruence between the
Senate and the agency varies. Second, we investigate the e¤ect of di¤erent informational
structures on the delegation bounds.
To understand how informational asymmetries shape the policy design, we start with
the appointments made by the President without the approval stage of the Senate (presi-
dential dominance). In designing the delegation set, within which the agency is given an
authority to make a policy, the President faces a basic trade-o¤ between using the depart-
ments information and keeping control of policymaking. This trade-o¤ determines the
bounds of the optimal delegation set. The main outcome from the presidential dominance
appointment is that the closer the agency is to the President, the more delegation to the
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agency is implied. On the other hand, with the Senates approval it is possible, in a simple
way, to aggregate the preferences of politicians with di¤erent ideal policies. This aggre-
gation of preferences results in the new governmentwhich is closer to the agency than
the President. This implies more delegation to the operating unit of the department. The
political weight of the Senate is endogenous to the model and it increases when there is an
asymmetry of information, hence an uncertainty has positive e¤ect on the Senates weight.
When the Senate is su¢ ciently close to the department, the fact that the Senates weight
in bargaining is endogenous implies that some delegation is possible regardless of the Pres-
idents ideal policy. Conversely, the presidential weight increases when more precise prior
information is available. An agency will be given less discretion, and in the limit, when
the information is complete, the politicianscontrol pins down to strict recommendations
on which policy to implement.
The earlier appointment theories featured dyads of a bureau and a government in-
stitution. Moe (1989, 1990) claimed presidential dominance in the appointment process.
Signicant presidential inuence is supported by the fact that presidential nominees for
executive o¢ ce are almost always conrmed by the Senate (Hammond and Hill, 1993). Re-
cent appointment literature added Congress to the presidential dominance models. Calvert
et al. (1989), Hammond and Hill (1993), Nokken and Sala (2000), McCarty and Ragazhian
(2000), and Chang (2001) concluded that although the President has agenda-setting power
in the appointment process, he must take into account the Senates preferences.3
The idea that the appointee plays no role in policymaking but reects the result of the
bargaining between the political principals is not new in the appointment literature. This
idea originated in Romer and Rothenthals (1978) classic model of agenda-setting, and was
then applied by Snyder and Weingast (2000) in their study of di¤erent appointment theo-
ries.4 Snyder and Weingast (2000) consider a two-stage model of the appointment process,
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where in the rst stage the President and the Senate bargain over the target policy and in
the second stage the agency makes a policy. However, they did not make an informational
distinction between the department and politicians. In this paper we explicitly incorporate
this informational distinction by modelling the departmental policymaking stage as one
of veto-based delegation.
The literature on veto-based delegation includes, among others, the inuential paper
by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) on information transmission in committees. This paper
shows that veto-based delegation is the optimal way to elicit information from a privately
informed agency. This kind of delegation is closely related to constrained delegation, that
is when the principal commits to constrain agency policymaking to a certain set of choices
(the delegation set). In particular, Melumad and Shibano (1994) and Mylovanov (2005)
indicate that under some natural conditions veto-based delegation is equivalent to con-
strained delegation. These papers suggest the method which we apply here. Instead of
considering the veto-based delegation we apply an equivalent formulation of the problem
as a constrained delegation. This allows a view of the appointment process as the es-
tablishment of the bounds of the delegation set which reects a compromise between the
interested politicians.
Holmström (1984) established the existence of the optimal delegation set in a model
with quadratic preferences. The optimal delegation sets for the large domain of single-
peaked preferences when the agency reports their peaks only was characterized in Moulin
(1980). He showed that any strategy-proof voting scheme is equivalent to the generalized
median rule. Using the smaller class of quadratic single-peaked preferences, Martimort and
Semenov (2006) recovered Moulins result and provided simple conditions for the interval
optimal delegation set. Alonso and Matouschek (2005) consider a general problem of
constrained delegation.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model
and a complete information benchmark. In Section 3, we develop the model in presence
of asymmetric information and the approval stage. In Section 4, we study the e¤ect of
information content of distribution on delegation patterns. Some concluding remarks are
given in Section 5.
2 The outline of the model
We consider a setting where a policy alternative q (such as trade tari¤s, regulated prices,
or pollution standards) must be chosen by a key government department. The set of
policy alternatives q is represented by the compact set A  R. The department consists
of two parts, the Head and the operating unit. The operating unit of the department,
which we call the agency, initiates the policy q and the Head approves or vetoes it. If
the Head vetoes the initiated policy the default option d prevails. The delegation nexus
in the model arises because the agency has private information about the departmental
operating environment  2 ;   A; which is taken for simplicity to be the agencys
ideal point. The Head of the department is subject to the appointment by the politicians
(the President and the Senate). The President and the Senate do not observe ; but have
common prior beliefs that are distributed according to F () :
The payo¤ function of the agency U (q; ) is quadratic with the peak at  : U (q; ) =
 12 (q   )2 : The politicians, the President (P ) and the Senate (S); have single-peaked
preferences which we assume for simplicity are also quadratic: Vi (q; ; i) =  12 (q      i)2
for i 2 fP; Sg : For the politician i, qi () =  + i is the ideal policy.5 The parameters
P and S represent the corresponding ideological distances or biases in the preferences of
the politicians compared to the agencys ideal point.6 All payo¤s are common knowledge.
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2.1 Timing
We model the appointment process as a two-stage game. In the rst stage the politicians
bargain over the candidacy of the Head and this bargain determines the Heads preferences.
The status quo policy which will be implemented should the bargain fail is taken to be
the agencys ideal point: qSQ () = :
The second stage species the policymaking process in the department. This stage of
the appointment process is modelled as a veto-based delegation. The veto-based delegation
as follows: Suppose that the Head of the department is appointed. Then the operating
unit initiates a policy q () which depends on its private information. The Head updates
her beliefs about  and then either approves or vetoes the policy, in which case the strategic
default arrangement d is implemented. There is no commitment at this stage on which
policy to approve or reject.
Melumad and Shibano (1994, the Summary Theorem) and Mylovanov (2005, the Veto-
Power Principle) show that the equilibrium of the veto-based delegation replicates the
outcome of constrained delegation.7 The intuition for the replication result is the following:
When the preferences are quadratic and the bias of the politician is positive, the optimal
delegation set has a form DP =
hbP ; i ; with some cut-o¤bP (for example, see Martimort
and Semenov 2006). If the politician sets the default option d = bP ; then in the veto-
based delegation game if the agency chooses the policy above bP ; the politician updates his
beliefs and approves the policy. This is optimal for the politician since the default option is
further away from his ideal point. Any o¤-the-equilibrium policies q < bP will be vetoed.
For example, this is optimal if the politician believes that  = q: Given that strategy, the
equilibrium strategy of the agency is q () =  if   bP and q () = bP otherwise. This
example shows that any delegation set with one cut-o¤ can be implemented as equilibrium
of the veto-based delegation game. What is important for us is that the politician chooses
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the default option in such a way that the equilibrium of the veto-based delegation game
replicates the optimal delegation set of the constrained delegation game. In a constrained
delegation the Head proposes a set fq ()g2, and the agency has discretion to choose any
policy from this set. This set D = fq ()g2, following Alonso and Matouschek (2005),
is called a delegation set.
The general game unfolds as follows: First the agency acquires the relevant information,
which is known only to the agency. Then the President makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er
to the Senate regarding the appointment of the Head or, equivalently, over the delegation
set D. When a compromise is achieved, the Head of the department is appointed and the
operating unit initiates a policy q 2 D. If the bargain between politicians fails the agency
is free to choose its ideal point that is the status quo.
2.2 Presidential dominance, delegation set
Assume in this subsection that the Senate is excluded from the appointment process and
the President is free to appoint the Head of the department. This way of interpreting
the appointment process is sometimes referred as the presidential dominance (Moe 1989,
1991). Note that if  is common knowledge then the President appoints a candidate who
implements the presidential ideal policy, + P . In the case when  is private information
the President appoints the Head who proposes a delegation set DP = fq ()g2, and the
agency has discretion to choose any policy from this set. In this paper we focus on the
interval delegation sets, i.e., when the agency is constrained only above and below. To
obtain this useful property of constrained delegation we assume that the distribution F ()
satises the following Assumption:
Assumption 1A. The distribution F () is a log-concave function with a di¤erentiable
density f such that f ()  f 0 () > 0 for all :8
8
Martimort and Semenov (2006) show that the optimal policy fq ()g2 in a setting
satisfying Assumption 1A is continuous and, therefore, the corresponding delegation set
D = fq ()g2 is an interval. The following Lemma provides the description of this set.
Lemma 1 (Martimort and Semenov 2006) Assume that the bias of the President is
positive, P > 0. The optimal delegation set is the interval, DP =
hbP ; i ; where the
cut-o¤ bP is uniquely dened by the condition:
P =
1
F
bP
bPZ

F () d: (1)
The optimal policy q () corresponding to the delegation set DP =
hbP ; i is rigid on
the interval
h
;bP i, q () = bP ; and on the interval hbP ; i it is identical to the agencys
ideal policy, q () = : This policy can be represented as9
q () = min
n
;bPo : (2)
The agency cannot make a policy below b, otherwise the policy choice is not restricted.
The choice of the delegation bound highlights the trade-o¤ faced by the President in
designing the optimal delegation set. The President wants to know the agencys ideal
policy in order to implement his preferred policy qP () =  + P ; however, this policy is
not incentive compatible. Therefore, he has to balance between the rigid policy, which is
closer in average to his preferred policy and the agencys ideal policy. The cut-o¤ value
bP in (1) reects the balance between the two types of policies. In particular, when the
agency is closer to the President it is given more discretion since the trade-o¤ goes in favor
of the agencys ideal policy.
Denote maxP =
Z

F () d as the maximum bias of the President when the non-trivial
delegation is possible, i.e., the delegation set DP =
hbP ; i is not a singleton.
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Example 1 For a uniform distribution on [0; 1] ; a constrained delegation is possible for
all P < maxP =
1
2 : The optimal policy has the form (2) with the cut-o¤:
bP = 1
F
bP
bPZ

F () d = 2P : (3)
Thus the President delegates to the agency the right to choose the policy on the interval
DP = [2P ; 1].
2.3 Bargain over appointment
In contrast to the presidential dominance appointment, now the President and the Senate
bargain when they are faced with an appointment opportunity. We model this stage as a
simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game. As the veto-based delegation in our setting is
equivalent to the constrained delegation over the set DP;S =
hbP;S ; i ; the natural way to
address the bargain between the President and the Senate is related to the choice of the
default option d = bP;S :
Consider rst the possible pairs (P ; S). Note that for S  P  0 the optimal
Senate-constrained policy coincides with the optimal policy for presidential dominance,
b = bP : The presidential proposal calls for more delegation than the Senate wishes, but the
complete delegation which is a status quo is even worse for the Senate. When S and P are
of di¤erent signs, i.e., the ideal points of the politicians lie on di¤erent sides of the agencys
ideal point, the President cannot nd a better solution than to propose the agencys ideal
point as the policy. It is not surprising that the Senate agrees with the proposal, and the
agency always implements the status quo.10 Summarizing, in order to have a non-trivial
problem, it is reasonable to consider only pairs (P ; S) with P  S  0.
Assumption 2. From now on we assume that P  S  0, i.e., the President has a
greater bias than the Senate.
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2.4 Complete Information Benchmark
When  is a common knowledge the model has a simple spatial structure; the Senate will
approve of all the presidential proposals which are closer to its ideal point than the status
quo. Formally, the President has to solve the following optimization problem:
max
q
VP (q; ; P ) =  1
2
(q      P )2 ; (4)
subject to the Senates constraint:
VS (q; ; S) =  1
2
(q      S)2  VS
 
qSQ () ; ; S

=  
2
S
2
: (5)
If the President proposes his ideal point, qP () = + P ; the Senate will approve that
policy if, and only if, it is closer to its ideal point than to the status quo . Hence, if
2S  P , then the presidential proposal is approved by the Senate. If 2S < P ; then,
if the President proposes his ideal point, the Senate rejects it and the agency is free to
implement the status quo. The President is then ready to o¤er the policy which is less
than his ideal point, and this policy has to be equidistant for the Senate to the status quo,
q () =  +min f2S ; P g :
The political weight of the Senate in the bargaining process can be expressed by the
Lagrange multiplier  = c of the constraint (5):
c = max

0;
P   2S
S

: (6)
This multiplier reects the fact that it is harder for the Senate to exploit its conrmation
authority if the status quo is far away (S is large). On the other hand if the President is
ideologically more distant (P is large) the Senate has more political weight.
In this section we dened the model and considered two benchmarks: presidential
dominance under private information and bargaining between the President and the Senate
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under complete information. As a convenience, Table 1 presents each parameter references
in the paper.
Table 1: Parameters in the model
Parameter Interpretation Range
q policy alternative A  R
 agencys ideal point

; 
  A
P ; S ; P;S biases of the politicians R+ = [0;1)
bP ;bP;S cut-o¤s ; 
DP ; DP;S delegation sets 2[
;]
 information content of F () R+
c;  political weights of the Senate R+
3 Constrained delegation with an approval stage
Assuming that the parameter  is private information to the agency, the delegation set is
an interval D =
hb; i ; with the corresponding policy:
q () = min
n
;bo ; (7)
where the cut-o¤ b represents the lower bound of delegation. The expected utility of the
political player i 2 fP; Sg is then given by
EVi
b =  1
2
8><>:
bZ

b      i2 dF () + 2i 1  F b
9>=>; :
The rst integral member in the above expression represents the expected payo¤ corre-
sponding to the rigid part of the policy (7): q () = b: Second term corresponds to the
exible part of the policy: q () = .
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The bargaining problem between the President and the Senate results in the maxi-
mization of the expected utility of the President:
maxb  
1
2
8><>:
bZ

b      P2 dF () + 2P 1  F b
9>=>; ; (8)
subject to the Senates constraint:
 1
2
8><>:
bZ

b      S2 dF () + 2S 1  F b
9>=>;  EVS  qSQ () ; ; S : (9)
EVS
 
qSQ () ; ; S

=   2S2 is the expected utility of the Senate under the status quo
policy: qSQ () = . Thus the problem of the President is to nd the lowest bound of
discretion of the agency bP;S that makes the Senate at least as well o¤ as under the status
quo in expected terms.
Denoting   0 as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Senates constraint (9),
we have the following characterization of the optimal delegation set:
Lemma 2 The optimal delegation set in the Senate-constrained problem DP;S =
hbP;S ; i
is characterized by the cut-o¤ bP;S determined from the equation
P;S =
1
F
bP;S
bP;SZ

F () d; (10)
where the bias
P;S =
P + S
1 + 
2 [S ; P ] : (11)
Since the Senate prefers more delegation than the President the bargain results in the
intermediate range of delegation corresponding to the delegation set DP;S =
hbP;S ; i ;
where bP;S  bP . The policy q () = minn;bP;So is more moderate than it would be in
the absence of the Senate. The President has to distort the policy towards the Senates
interests; otherwise the policy will be rejected. So, the status quo qSQ () =  is more
attractive for the Senate from the ex-ante perspective than the presidential dominance
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policy q () = min
n
;bPo depicted on Figure 1 by dashed line. The Senates optimal
policy would be much lower, but since it is the President who proposes the Head, the
compromise policy (the solid line) gives the Senate exactly the same expected payo¤ as
the status quo. As a result, the optimal delegation set DP;S =
hbP;S ; i assumes more
delegation than the President-only delegation set DP =
hbP ; i : DP  DP;S : The cut-o¤
bP;S implicitly dened by (10) reects the compromise between the desire of the President
to have more control and the Senates preferences for more delegation.
q
q
q q
DP
$ Pq
Pq d+
President’s
ideal policy
Agent’s ideal
policy
Senate’s
ideal policy
Sq d+
$ ,P Sq
DP,S
q
The optimal policy, ( )q q q=
Figure1. Optimal delegation set and policy.
The bargain between the President and the Senate leads to the problem similar to
the presidential dominance case where the President can be treated as an aggregated
government with bias P;S 2 [S ; P ] : The agency is closer to this aggregated government
than the President and, therefore, it has more discretion.
As in the complete information benchmark we may associate the political weight of the
Senate with the Lagrange multiplier  of the Senates constraint (9). If  = 0; then the
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Senate has no political weight in bargaining and the President is not restricted in designing
the optimal policy. The bias of the aggregated government is the one whereby P;S = P .
The cut-o¤ bP;S = bP can be drawn from the same expression (1) which characterizes the
case of presidential dominance. If  > 0; then the Senates constraint (9) is binding, and
the cut-o¤ bP;S is given by
S =
1bP;SZ

F (t) dt
bP;SZ

264 Z

F (t) dt
375 d: (12)
Equations (1) and (12) allow us to study the comparative statics question of interest,
namely how changes in the bias of the Senate S a¤ect the delegation bounds. The
justication for the choice of S as a changing parameter is two-fold: First, the Senates
elections are held twice as often as the presidential ones. Second, only one-third of the
Senate stands for reelection every two years.
Proposition 1 At the Senate approval stage there exists a cut-o¤ level of the Senates
bias with the agency S 2 [0; P ] so that:
i) For all S  S the Senate has no inuence on the President in choosing the optimal
delegation bounds;
ii) For all S < S the lower bound bP;S of the optimal delegation set DP;S = hbP;S ; i
is characterized by (12). The agency is given more authority compared to the presidential
dominance.
Proof. The right-hand sides of (1) and (12) determine the increasing functions
' () =
1
F ()
Z

F (x) dx; and  () =
1
Z

F (t) dt
Z

264 xZ

F (t) dt
375 dx;
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with the graph of ' () situated strictly above the graph of  () ; ' () >  (). Therefore
there exists a unique level of Senate bias S < P , determined by
S =  
 
' 1 (P )

; (13)
for which the cut-o¤ value b (S) = ' 1 (S) is equal to the cut-o¤ for the President-only
optimal policy bP =   1 (P ) : It follows by construction that for cut-o¤s S greater than
S and the constraint of the Senate is not binding. Indeed, because of the log-concavity
of F; b (S) < b (S) = bP and we obtain
1bPZ

F (t) dt
bPZ

264 Z

F (t) dt
375 d > 1b(S)Z

F (t) dt
b(S)Z

264 Z

F (t) dt
375 d = S :
Then the Senate constraint is slack the political weight of the Senate, ; is zero. When
S < 

S we have e < P ; therefore the political weight of the Senate is strictly positive.
Since in this case b (S) < bP , the introduction of the approval procedure by the Senate
benets the agency by allowing more delegation compared to the presidential dominance
case. The optimal policy is uniquely characterized by b = min' 1 (P ) ;   1 (S)	 :
3.1 Discussion and example
This proposition portrays the crucial role played by the Senate in the appointment process
when it is not too far away from the agency. The hidden cooperation with the agency
allows the Senate to exploit its conrmation authority in order to inuence the presidential
nomination decision. From Figure 1, the Senates ideal policy qS () = +S in the middle
of the state space is closer to the rigid part of the President-only optimal policy (dashed
line) than to the agency ideal policy. However, this comes at the cost of more distanced
policy on the left tail of the state space. If the distribution puts su¢ cient weight on this
tail (as with a uniform distribution), it is more protable for the Senate to turn to the
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status quo. To prevent this outcome, the President has to distort his proposal downward
(solid line). Intuition says that if the prior puts less weight to the tails (as for the normal
case) the President does not have to distort the policy too much. In any case for su¢ ciently
small conicts, the Senate values information more than control and it has more political
weight in forcing the decision towards delegation. If the President is signicantly biased,
then there is too little delegation in the Presidents optimal policy so the Senate interferes
in the appointment process.
Example 2 (Uniform distribution.) For a uniform distribution f  Uniform [0; 1] :
' () =
1
F ()
Z
0
F (x) dx =

2
; and  () =
1
Z
0
F (t) dt
Z
0
24 xZ
0
F (t) dt
35 dx = 
3
:
The threshold conict S dened by (13) is 

S =  
 
' 1 (P )

= 23P :
Let us x the bias of the President, P = 13 ; and the Senate, S =
1
6 . Then the
threshold level after which the Senate has no weight in the bargain is S =
2
3P =
2
9 : Since
S =
1
6 < 

S, the weight of the Senate in bargain is non-zero and equal to:
 =
2P   3S
S
= 1:
The bias of the Senate-constrained problem is given by (11): P;S =
P+S
1+ =
1
4 :
Hence, the lower bound of the delegation set bP;S = 2P;S = 12 :
Under presidential dominance the delegation set is determined by the lower bound bP
from (3), bP = 2P = 23 :
Note that under complete information c = P 2SS = 0: Since the Senates ideal point
is half-way between the ideal points of the agency and the President, the Senate cannot
exploit its closeness to the agency and the resulting policy will be as if there were no agency.
Instead, under asymmetric information the Senate has positive weight and the resulting
policy gives more authority to the agency: bP = 23 > bP;S = 12 .
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Let us change the Senates bias, S = 112 . Then
bP;S = 14 , and the agency is delegated
policymaking over DP;S =

1
4 ; 1

: In general, when S ! 0; then  = 2P 3SS ! 1 andbP;S = 2 P+S1+  ! 0. In the limit, since there is no conict of interests, the agency is
granted full freedom to make policy.
The maximum bias in (12) which allows for a constrained delegation is for bP;S = :
This leads to
Corollary 1 If S < maxS =
1
Z

F (t)dt
Z

264 xZ

F (t) dt
375 dx then there is always a constrained
delegation of policymaking to the agency.
Comparing maxS with the highest ideological distance 
max
P of the President when the
constrained delegation is possible under the presidential dominance appointment yields
maxS =
1
Z

F (t) dt
Z

264 xZ

F (t) dt
375 dx  maxP = Z

F () d: (14)
The agency is always delegated policymaking rights on some interval if the bias of the
Senate is not too large irrespective of the presidential ideological distance. Compared to
the presidential dominance appointment, even if the Presidents bias is great and does not
allow for delegation in the absence of the Senate, with the Senate, it is still possible to
have constrained delegation. To gain intuition assume that the bias of the President P is
large, so that there is no delegation in the presidential dominance appointment: bP = :
As can be seen from Figure 1 this policy will never pass the Senates conrmation if the
bias of the Senate is not too high. The status quo policy is more attractive for the Senate
than the rigid policy q () = : So, although the President has the right to propose any
alternative, his position may be weakened by the implicit cooperation between the agency
and the Senate.
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It is di¢ cult to compare the weight of the Senate under asymmetric information and
its complete information analog. The status quo policy is no longer a point - rather,
it is a rule which depends on the state of nature. However, one can compare the  =
max
n
0; 2P 3SS
o
under uniform priors with c = max
n
0; P 2SS
o
in the complete infor-
mation benchmark. This leads to
 > c:
More about this inequality will be given in the next Section where we will see the e¤ect
the information content of the prior distribution has on the bounds of delegation.11 In
this case it is possible explicitly to relate the weight of the Senate under asymmetric
information to its complete-information analog.
4 Information content of distribution
In this Section we study the impact of the information content of the prior distribution on
the bounds of the delegation set. Some of the regulatory agencies or federal departments
are better known to the general public and/or to the politicians owing to media publicity.
Some may operate in an environment in which special knowledge is not required. What
happens if the politicians have more accurate information about the distribution of the
ideal points of the agency? In the absence of the Senate, the President benets from the
information content because prior information itself allows the principal to design a policy
and the information privately held by the agency becomes less important. We will show
that this e¤ect is still present with the Senates approval of appointments, although it is
less pronounced.
Assume that the status quo  is normally distributed,   N  0; 1
2

; where ; the
inverse of standard deviation, is the measure of the information content of the distribution.
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In our framework the politicians delegate policymaking in the interval D:12 Since the
normal distribution does not satisfy Assumption 1A we need another assumption to obtain
an interval delegation set.
Assumption 1B. P  S > 1
q
2
 :
For our purposes this Assumption is not restrictive since we are interested in the e¤ect
of increase of information content : The optimal policy under the Assumption 1B is
continuous (see Semenov 2005, Proposition 2.2., p. 55). and, therefore, the delegation set
is an interval. To see the e¤ect of the information content of distribution on delegation
bounds we x the biases P and S ; where P  S > 1
q
2
 . The optimal policy is then
q (; ) = max
n
;bP;S ()o ; where bP;S () is characterized by
P;S () =
1
F
bP;S () ; 
bP;S()Z
 1
F (; ) d: (15)
In the above expression the bias P;S () =
P+()S
1+() ; where the Senates political weight,
 =  () is a function of the information content of the distribution. For a xed level of
the information content , either the Senate has no political weight,  () = 0; or  () > 0
in which case the cut-o¤ level bP;S () is given by
S =
1bP;S()Z
 1
F (t; ) dt
bP;S()Z
 1
xZ
 1
F (t; ) dtdx: (16)
We rewrite (15) as
P;S () = bP;S ()  1
2F
bP;S () ; 
bP;S()Z
 1
f (; ) d;
hence bP;S ()  !
!1 
1
P;S ; where 
1
P;S is the limit of the bias P;S (). The normal dis-
tribution N
 
0; 1
2

for a very small parameter  can be approximated by the uniform
distribution with support [ R;R] for R great enough and when  ! 1 it converges to
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the case of complete information. Therefore, the limit 1P;S is equal to the complete in-
formation bias: 1P;S =
S+P
2 : Since in the case of a uniform distribution (see example)
S =  
 
' 1 (P )

= 23P ; we have the following:
Lemma 3 a) The political weight of the Senate is equal to zero if S  23P ; b) If 12P <
S <
2
3P then there exists 
 such that 8 < ;  () > 0 and 8  ;  () = 0; c) If
0  S  12P then 8;  () > 0:
The next Proposition says that more precise information leads to a smaller delegation
set.
Proposition 2 As the information content of F (; ) increases, the President gives less
authority to the agency, i.e., the cut-o¤ level bP;S () is an increasing function of the
information content of the distribution  : dd
bP;S () > 0:
Proof. From (16) it follows that
R bP;S()
 1
bP;S ()     SF (; ) d = 0: Di¤erentiat-
ing this equation with respect to  yields
dbP;S ()
d
"Z bP;S()
 1
F (; ) d   SF
bP;S () ; #+Z bP;S()
 1
b ()     SF (; ) d = 0:
Thus the sign of d
bP;S()
d is the same as the sign of the expression
 
Z bP;S()
 1
bP;S ()     SF (; ) d =  Z bP;S()
 1
bP;S ()     S e  222 d =
=
1
2
Z bP;S()
 1
bP;S ()     S de  222 = 1
2
"
 Se 
b2P;S()2
2 +
Z bP;S()
 1
e 
22
2 d
#
> 0:
4.1 Discussion and example
The previous Proposition says that the better the information, the less the politicians
delegate. Ideally, when the information is precise,  =1; there is no uncertainty and the
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complete information policy 1P;S =
S+P
2 (Figure 2), situated between the ideal points
of the President and the Senate, is implemented. When there is uncertainty and the
information content of the prior distribution  increases, the threshold level bP;S () also
increases. In the Figure 2, bP;S (1) > bP;S (2) for 1 > 2: The intuition is that the
rigid policy that is close to the average bias of politicians performs relatively well since
the normal distribution in this case is more centered and the weight of tails is smaller.
Technically, the expression (15) implies that the bias P;S () increases with : Therefore
the objective of the aggregated government becomes closer to those of the President and
the political weight of the Senate  () decreases.
Pd
Sd
$ ( ), 1P Sq s
( )q q
,P Sd
¥
q$ ( ), 2P Sq s
The optimal policy
for
The optimal policy
for
Complete
information policy,
( )1s ( )2s
( )
'
q
The agency s
ideal policy
q q=
Figure 2. The e¤ect of increase of informativeness.
Example 3 Let us put the biases of the President and the Senate at P = 3 and S = 1
respectively. Since S < 1P;S = 2; the optimal policy is given by (16). Fix the initial
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information content at 1 = 1; then (16) becomes
1 =
1
aZ
 1
tZ
 1
e 
x2
2 dxdt
aZ
 1
Z
 1
tZ
 1
e 
x2
2 dxdtd;
which leads to bP;S (1) = 1:34:
When 2 = 3 then bP;S (2) = 1:94: Generally, when  ! 1, the optimal threshold
approaches the complete information policy: 1P;S =
S+P
2 = 2:
5 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a bargaining model between politicians in the appointment process
when there is an asymmetric information between a key government department and
politicians. We described the bargain over an appointment when the President takes
into account the Senates preferences when considering a nomination of the Head of the
department. The main goal of the Head is to establish the limits of the departmental
discretion and these limits are the subjects of bargaining between politicians.
Although we model the policymaking process as veto-based delegation, we do so in the
context of the more convenient constrained-delegation framework. This approach allows us
to aggregate the preferences of the politicians. The Senates political weight in aggregated
government is endogenous and it depends on its ideological bias as well as that of the
President. It also depends on the prior beliefs of politicians. Using the tools developed in
the paper it is possible to study di¤erent comparative statics questions. Tables 2 and 3
summarize the general thrust of the results for di¤erent cases.
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Table 2: Presidential dominance vs. the Senates approval of appointments
Appointment process
Presidential dominance Senates approval stage (Senate-constrained)
1. Delegation in DP Delegation in DP;S( DP )
2. Partial communication is possible Partial communication is possible
for P  maxP for any P given that S  maxS
3. Weight of the Senate  = 0 Weight of the Senate  > 0 if S  maxS
Table 3: Common knowledge vs. private information
Information structure
Common knowledge Private information
1. No delegation Delegation in D
2. Weight of the Senate c Weight of the Senate  > c
We believe that our approach to modeling the appointment process may prove useful
for future research. A constrained-delegation framework greatly simplies the modeling
of the appointment process without losing its realistic content. However, in this paper we
assumed appointments to departments with only a single appointee at the helm. Although
this assumption simplies the exposition, it reduces the applicability of the model to a
limited number of cases. The policymaking in a standard regulatory agency such as
the Federal Communications Commission is a result of voting amongst commissioners. A
more complete discussion of the appointment process would examine the majority voting
in such a commission.
Another interesting aspect of the appointment process related to the role of the Senate
committee to which presidential nominations are assigned. The civil servant (Head), as
is studied in the political literature, may play an active role in the policymaking. The
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Senate receives an imperfect signal from the committee about the nominees preferences.
These and many other issues can be addressed using the tools proposed in this paper.
Notes
1To simplify matters we do not consider commission nominations. In our model only the Head is
subject to nomination by the President and conrmation by the Senate. Although the model in the
paper is motivated by non-commission departments, it may also be applied to regulatory agencies with a
commission structure under the condition that the decisive body is entirely subject to nomination, which,
for example, is often the case at the state level of government.
2Niskanen (1971) pioneered the application of the principal-agent theory to bureaucratic politics.
3Chang, de Figueiredo and Weingast (2001) provide a thorough survey of the theories of the appointment
process.
4 In the appointment framework, the President is the setter, the nominee is the proposal and the Senate
is the conrmer.
5 In the paper, for the sake of simplicity, the ideal points of the President and the Senate change in
lock-step with the agencys ideal point. However, the ideal points of the politicians may be sensitive to
the agencys operating environment: qi () = k + i for i 2 fP; Sg ; where the parameter k is taken in
such a way that the ideal policies for politicians and the agency do not intersect. If so, then all results are
unchanged.
6 In the political economy literature, the politicians bias is explained by the broader set of constituencies,
votersinterests and/or reelection concerns.
7The replication result was established for regular preferences, i.e. such that the ideal policies of the
players do not intersect. This class is su¢ ciently broad to include our quadratic preferences.
8Many distributions satisfy this property: any distribution with decreasing density, such as the uniform
and exponential distributions.
9These continuous policies (2) were already described in Moulin (1980). However, his characterization
was obtained by imposing a dominant strategy on a larger domain including all single-peaked preferences.
Our restriction to quadratic preferences could a priori leave open the possibility that other policies might
arise, but Lemma 1 shows that this is actually not the case.
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10Remarks 1 and 2 are trivial in the complete information setup of Romer and Rothenthal (1978). I
thank the referee for this and other useful remarks.
11The Editor suggested to use the term information content of distribution. I thank the Editor for
this and many other sugestions.
12 If the distribution F does not satisfy Assumption 1A the set D may not be an interval (Martimort
and Semenov, 2006).
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